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Purpose: Academics are at the forefront of criticisms about so-called “fake news” considered to
undermine evidence-based approaches to the understanding of complex social, political, and
economic issues. However, universities contribute to the production of fake news through the
legitimization of measures that promote student performativity rewarding their academic non-
achievements. This conceptual article will seek to illustrate how this can occur via the writing of
methodology chapters by postgraduate students.
Design/Approach/Methods: This article provides a critical analysis of the writing of metho-
dology chapters in dissertations and theses in postgraduate education in the social sciences. In so
doing, it applies the concept of performativity to student learning.
Findings: It is argued that the pressures on students to comply with the requirements of
emotional performativity in respect to ideology and method in close-up, qualitative research can
lead to fake learning. This phenomenon may be exemplified by reference to a number of practices,
namely, phony positionality, methodolatry, ethical cleansing, participatory posturing, and symbolic
citation.
Originality/Value: This article provides an illustration of the concept of student performativity. It
demonstrates that emotional performativity plays a significant role in the way in which students are
required to comply with expectations that give rise to inauthenticity in learning.
Corresponding author:
Bruce Macfarlane, School of Education, University of Bristol, 35 Berkeley Square, Bristol, BS8 1JA, UK.
Email: profbmac@gmail.com
ECNU Review of Education
1–16





Creative Commons Non Commercial CC BY-NC: This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/4.0/) which permits
non-commercial use, reproduction and distribution of the work without further permission provided the original work is attributed as
specified on the SAGE and Open Access pages (https://us.sagepub.com/en-us/nam/open-access-at-sage).
Keywords
Fake learning, methodolatry, qualitative research, student performativity
Date received: 14 October 2020; accepted: 8 December 2020
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed escalating concern in academe about the spread of so-called “fake
news.” According to what is fast becoming conventional wisdom, fake news is generated by
appeals to emotion with politicians and the social media at the center of such allegations. This
tends to result in the marginalization of experts including academic researchers, among others. The
victims of fake news are said to be the public who are duped into a false understanding based on
allegation, emotion, and rumor rather than hard evidence. Academics can also find their empirical
work misrepresented, or simply ignored. This conventional interpretation of fake news is now
widespread. Yet, is it possible that the university, including some of the knowledge produced by
academics and students, might be part of the problem too? Are they contributing in any way to
“faking” as well? The notion that academe may be helping to create fake news may, at first blush,
be considered a controversial and even somewhat perverse suggestion. Yet the notion of trust-
worthiness cuts both ways and forms of academic fraud have always existed.
Academic fraud tends to be conventionally thought of in dramatic, headline-grabbing terms.
The acronym “FFP”—Falsification, Fabrication, and Plagiarism—is repeatedly intoned in discus-
sions about research misconduct in the hard sciences. These academic crimes attract a lot of
attention because they are clear-cut instances of a lack of academic integrity. In reality, there are
considerably more subtle, ethically borderline practices that can go almost completely under the
radar. Citing sources without reading them, or understanding them properly, is a commonplace
enough example. Who has not cut corners occasionally or relied simply on an abstract in citing an
academic paper before? Data gathering and analysis in qualitative research is rarely subject to
forensic scrutiny either, and many decisions that lone investigators make, in including or excluding
data, or carrying out thematic analysis, tend to be highly idiosyncratic in practice. Claims that
researchers have followed a formal process of qualitative analysis quite often lack an evidential
base as themes are reported to “emerge.” In other words, academic fraud needs to be understood in
all its subtlety and sophistication and can be much harder to detect than the familiar acronym FFP
might imply.
In understanding why fraud occurs, it is important to understand that student learning at
university has been converted from a private space into a public performance (Macfarlane,
2015). One example of this phenomenon is the way in which students are increasingly required
to show how they are learning in the classroom through the grading of their formal and informal
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oral contributions. The demands of performativity are now embedded in the learning environments
of universities, and setting assessment tasks that encourage academic non-achievement are com-
monplace (Macfarlane, 2017). The phrase “academic non-achievement,” originally used by Sadler
(2010, p. 727), refers to student grading based, at least in part, on behavioral and transactional
incentives. An example is attending lectures, or displaying enthusiasm and asking questions, in
order to get a class contribution grade. The concept of student performativity—bodily, participa-
tive, and emotional (Macfarlane, 2017)—is a way of understanding academic non-achievement in
a broader and more comprehensive framework. Bodily performativity includes mandatory atten-
dance at lectures and other face-to-face teaching contexts. The emphasis on students making oral
contributions in class and working collaboratively as a member of a group leads to participative
performativity, while the need for learners to increasingly surface their feelings and emotions and
prove that they have found particular educational experiences “transformational,” “inspiring,” or
in some other way influential on their thinking constitutes emotional performativity. The pressure
to conform to these expectations is promoted by so-called student engagement policies. These
reward forms of academic non-achievement common in both compulsory and higher education
through measures such as class attendance, class contribution grades based on attendance records
and/or observable levels of student engagement, as well as other indicators of compliance with the
values promoted by the university, such as global citizenship (e.g. volunteering) (Coates &
McCormick, 2014; Kuh et al., 2008).
The purpose of this article is to present a conceptual analysis of the way in which student
learning can be faked in the sense that students will learn how to comply with performative
demands—even where they are not explicitly acknowledged by universities or university aca-
demics. In so doing, I will extend my earlier analysis of emotional performativity in student
learning which was mainly concerned with reflective writing (Macfarlane, 2017) by exploring
the way in which it plays a role in student (and wider academic) writing about methodology in an
education and social science context. The writing of methodology chapters in dissertations and
theses is, I believe, an important example of where students need to demonstrate emotional
performativity in complying with implicit criteria connected with the ideological beliefs of aca-
demics. I will argue that this can occur with the full, or at least partial, complicity of academics
working as postgraduate research supervisors. In elaborating my argument, I will focus on the
following five examples: phony positionality, methodolatry, ethical cleansing, participatory pos-
turing, and symbolic citation.
Faking qualitative research
Close-up qualitative research occurs where “the researcher tries to get relatively ‘close’ to the
meanings, ideas, discursive and/or social practices of a group of people . . . ” (Alvesson, 2003,
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p. 168). In educational research, this normally occurs when researchers study their own organi-
zation, or a relevantly similar one, and tend to focus their investigation on understanding issues
affecting academic staff and students in a university department, college, or school. The researcher
will often be a complete or at least partial insider in the sense that they either work in the same
organization that they are simultaneously researching or have the status of an external “colleague”
working in a parallel one. Close-up, qualitative work makes few (if any) claims to generalizability
and, in a low-status academic field such as education, rarely gets much public attention. Yet, the
nature of this research raises a wide range of ethical issues that are extremely complex to deal with
such as insiderism, negotiating the pitfalls of organizational politics, and an often wafer-thin
dividing line between researcher and participant (or none at all in the case of self-ethnography).
The extent to which researchers are engaging authentically or merely “doing rapport,” “faking
friendship,” “faking solidarity,” or even faking identity online are relevant for any close-up,
qualitative researcher (e.g., see Duncombe & Jessop, 2002). Close-up research requires personal
contact between the researcher and the participant and so giving an appearance of sincerity can be
regarded as a work-related, investigatory skill (Alvesson, 2003).
These are all important ethical issues, but it is not my purpose in this article to focus on these
relatively well-known concerns here as others have done so already in greater depth than I can hope
to cover. Instead, I wish to raise a broader question around “faking.” This is the increasing
tendency, as I see it, for the philosophy and language of close-up, qualitative research—criticality,
reflexivity, statements of positionality, discussions of insiderism, and so on—to be the subject of a
strategic deception. Here I am mainly, although not exclusively, thinking of master’s and doctoral
students (but some university academics as well) and referring to the way in which they can adopt
the language of the close-up, qualitative researcher in a compliant, mechanical, and ultimately
inauthentic way.
Phony positionality
In qualitative and mixed methods research, there is now a strong emphasis on the importance of
researcher reflection (Lewthwaite & Nind, 2016). This involves being explicit about values which
the researcher holds and demonstrating a preparedness to self-evaluate how these may have shaped
the philosophical assumptions informing research design. A reticence to be explicit about personal
values is considered a failing among researchers since these beliefs, it is frequently argued, will
inevitably play a role in framing any investigation (Hammersley, 2006). The modern necessity for
a researcher to be open and explicit about their positionality is closely related to the broader trend
in education and society in which a “confessional” discourse has become commonplace (Fejes &
Dahlstedt, 2013). A positionality statement in a dissertation or thesis is the equivalent of reflective
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writing exercises found elsewhere within the contemporary undergraduate, postgraduate, and
professional curriculum at university.
Selecting a methodology—as opposed to just a method—is a daunting prospect for postgraduate
research students. In most postgraduate research training programs, the teaching of research
methods invariably occurs a matter of weeks, or a few months at best, before students need to
start writing a methodology chapter in which they are expected to sign up to one of several
competing “philosophies.” As part of this process, students are normally encouraged to write a
“positionality” statement within their methodology chapter. Positionality refers to the relationship
between the researcher and their research topic. Someone’s positionality is shaped by their world-
view and implies reflexive self-awareness of assumptions along with how these views are rooted in
their social identity. Gregory et al. (2011, p. 556) stressed that “a researcher’s social, cultural and
subject positions (and other psychological processes) affect: the questions they ask; how they
frame them; the theories that they are drawn to; how they read . . . ” There is, in short, a growing
emphasis on researchers making their positionality explicit. A good positionality statement is
shaped by a reflexively self-aware account of someone’s worldview incorporating their personal
beliefs, sense of personal identity and politics, philosophical assumptions, biases, and prejudices. It
implies a deep analysis of assumptions and how these are rooted in our own social identities.
Yet, in practice, positionality statements can be self-stereotyping by focusing on single points of
identity, such as class and gender, rather than a more complex and real interconnectedness of a
person’s identity and their assumptions about the world which flow from this level of detailed self-
analysis. A self-stereotyping positionality statement seeks to establish that the investigator has a
distinctive, and even to some extent superior, moral claim to researching the subject since they
have personal experience that gives them special insight into the world of their participants.
Merton (1972) recognized the emergence of this type of reasoning when he commented:
In its strong version, the argument holds that, as a matter of social epistemology, only black historians
can truly understand black history, only black ethnologists can understand black culture, only black
sociologists can understand the social life of blacks, and so on. (p. 103)
This type of rationale stands conventional notions about the objectivity of the researcher on its
head together with the risks of insiderism making it into a virtue rather than a vice. Cousin (2010,
p. 9) has used the term “positional piety” to refer to situations where affinity with participants is
considered to invest the researcher with superior moral authority.
However, the pressure of self-disclosure means that positionality statements can be ritualistic
and inauthentic. Such statements tend to cover up the fact that methodological reflexivity is an
idealistic luxury with researchers making quick and instinctive decisions much of the time in
practice. Student teachers’ reflections show a desire to conform and fit in (McGarr & McCormack,
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2014) and this effect can also be detected in positionality statements too. This type of “faking” is
about more than poor scholarship. Hobbs’ (2007) account of the way in which she resorted to a
“strategic deception” in producing a reflective piece of writing to satisfy assessment requirements
is a perfect illustration of this phenomenon (p. 414). Reflection is an act of confession and
self-disclosure—whether real or fake. In composing such statements, students are complying with
what they perceive to be a performative requirement to link the ontological with the epistemolo-
gical. Can academics assessing such work really distinguish between a real and a phony one?
Methodolatry
The expression “methodolatry” (Janesick, 1994) conjoins the words “method” and “ideology.” It
refers to a reification of a particular method regardless of the practical considerations of research-
ing the subject in question resulting in “a preoccupation with selecting and defending methods to
the exclusion of the actual substance of the story being told” (Janesick, 1994). Even mixed
methods, once a loosely bounded concept, has been formalized in recent years into a “thing”
despite the lack of integration of findings in practice (Hesse-Biber, 2015). This means that there
are a growing band of researchers who believe that there is a compelling case for the use of mixed
methods to the exclusion of single methods.
Sociology, it has been argued, is the most “methodology-conscious” of the social science
disciplines (Francis, 1969, p. 122) and its influence plays a leading role within the teaching of
research methods in education. This methodology-consciousness means that methodolatry thrives
in qualitative social science research, resulting in the oversimplified dichotomization of ideologi-
cal camps such as “positivists” and “phenomenologists.” The authors of well-known textbooks on
research methods are sometimes identified as responsible for reinforcing this type of division:
Philosophers of science cannot be readily identified as members of warring camps, and their positions
cannot be readily individuated on the basis of the categories that Cohen et al. employ. (Rowbottom &
Aiston, 2007, p. 19)
The role of the teacher-researcher also needs to be understood and acknowledged in the context of
this issue. The ideological commitments of academics working as teachers and supervisors in
relation to methods courses are a critical source in influencing student interpretations. Hesse-
Biber (2015, p. 779) commented on the way in which, in teaching her own mixed methods novices,
students report “having a hard time fitting their research project into one of the designs offered by
an expert knowledge builder in the field of mixed methods” and that “there is an underlying
acceptance of these designs as if they are ‘real/concrete’, and one must be selected.” The fact that
students feel under pressure to take a position is hardly surprising given the emphasis placed on
different ideologies of design in research methods training.
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Yet, sadly, the way in which students feel impelled to sign up to a methodological camp is rarely
recognized as a potential problem even by those offering so-called “expert perspectives” in the
teaching of research methods. Research methods experts such as Andy Field and Amanda Coffey
proffer the view that teaching styles are legitimately individualized, while Johnny Saldaña goes
further by proudly proclaiming that “we teach who we are” (Lewthwaite & Nind, 2016, p. 421).
This means that passionately shared attitudes involving the fetishization of particular methods
and approaches are directly passed on to students by academics. At one level, this type of advocacy
is an understandable expression of academic freedom. Yet it can also result in a negative impact on
the academic freedom of students with limited self-confidence. Self-censorship and compliance
with the approach advocated by the teacher-researcher is a frequently observed consequence
(Macfarlane, 2017).
Students are told that describing their methods of data collection alone is not enough and that
they “must” have a philosophical “position” which nails their colors to a particular ideological
mast. Unsurprisingly, when faced with this decision, students will more often than not choose
the course of least resistance by plumping for the same philosophical position favored by their
supervisors. This provides an ingrained and efficiently reproducible blueprint. To do otherwise
would be akin to a professor of politics informing a student that they are a liberal democrat and
then expecting the student to write an essay from the position of a Marxist. In practice, only the
extremely courageous or self-confident will give expression to an alternative perspective. This is
why methodology chapters written by postgraduate research students are littered with often
unconvincing declarations of commitment to an off-the-textbook-shelf methodological stance
such as “constructivism,” “interpretivism,” “social realism,” “grounded theory,” “bricolage,” or
“auto-ethnography.” Some students may genuinely hold these positions, but compliance,
self-censorship, and a lack of self-confidence will result in others feigning allegiance as well.
Participatory posturing
The rejection of positivism within qualitative research is now practically an article of faith among
qualitative researchers. Recent years have witnessed the movement to promote a more democratic
role for participants in mixed methods research too (Torrance, 2012). The phrase “research sub-
ject” is eschewed and the word “participant” has become de rigueur. The promise conveyed by this
word implies the emancipation and empowerment of the “participant” in a relationship where
meaning is negotiated and co-constructed. It can further imply the involvement of end users and
communities in the application and control of the results of research in what is a democratic project
respecting the rights of all affected parties. In other words, the participant is genuinely participat-
ing rather than experiencing a brief, essentially transactional relationship with the researcher.
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In practice, students pursuing independent research, especially at master’s level, need to com-
plete their dissertations within very short time frames often in less than 6 months. After ethical
approval is granted for fieldwork to commence, students may only have a few months at best to
engage with participants. As a result, even if they are committed to the principles of emancipatory
research, students are highly unlikely to be able to practically effect a genuinely deep or mean-
ingful engagement. Yet, the word “participant” is used habitually, and even zealously, in metho-
dology chapters to describe those who play virtually no meaningful participatory role beyond
being interviewees, members of focus groups, or even respondents to questionnaires.
The “co-creation” of research with communities is another buzz phrase. This can lead to
exaggerated claims about the extent to which communities share in the control of research pro-
cesses and results, something that has been observed in respect to academic research more gen-
erally (e.g., Vines et al., 2013). It is an equal if not greater risk in respect to student research
projects where an individual researcher, rather than a team, with limited time, experience, and
resources is seeking to comply with an expectation that qualitative research protects and promotes
the engagement of marginalized communities. Demonstrating a faux sensitivity toward such
communities has become a further ritual of the close-up, qualitative researcher. In practice, doing
co-production is enormously difficult to achieve, time-consuming, and politically rife. Few
researchers really achieve such goals. Yet, many feel increasingly impelled to make weak claims
that their participants have really participated beyond being milked for their data.
A further aspect to participatory posturing is that it is common for qualitative researchers to
claim that they are using an ethnographic framework when, in practice, there is often insufficient
evidence that such an assertion is defensible. There are practical reasons why this claim can also be
suspect. The short duration of a research student’s engagement in an organizational context and the
limited nature of data gathering that takes place, often consisting of little more than interviews,
means that few are real “ethnographers” in the true sense of the word. Here, it would be more
authentic if claims were couched in terms of drawing on ethnographic techniques rather than
researchers over-egging their ethnographic credentials (Wolcott, 1999).
Ethical cleansing
Some reference to research ethics is now a more or less compulsory part of any research metho-
dology chapter and, indeed, published papers. However, the manner in which this occurs is fre-
quently tokenistic and highly defensive based on a curiously “front-ended” approach to
understanding how ethical issues arise in research (Macfarlane, 2009). In other words, potential
ethical issues need to be identified by the researcher in advance of undertaking their research. This
process has tidied research ethics into a neat, but thoroughly inauthentic, bureaucratic bundle. In
practice, many senior academics regard ethical approval processes as a tiresome administrative
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chore and delegate the task to a junior member of their research team. Hence, “doing the ethics”
has been made into a standardized procedure at the expense of what it ought to be: a thinking
exercise in the research field.
Hughes (2005) used the phrase “ethical cleansing” (p. 229) to describe university ethical
approval processes since they are largely concerned with institutional risk management rather
than real research ethics with all its attendant messiness. The upshot of this is that gaining ethical
approval has become a proxy for students “covering ethics” in relation to methodology. There are
two problems with the way this is occurring. Firstly, real research ethics begins when an inves-
tigation commences (as opposed to before it begins) and complexities which have not necessarily
been considered in advance are encountered.
Ethical practice is an ongoing interaction of values in shifting contexts and relationships, rather than
something delivered by a signed consent form or adherence to a static set of principles. (Hughes, 2005,
p. 231)
This lack of predictability is especially true in qualitative research given that research instruments
typically need to be developed and adapted in tandem with data collection. Interview schedules, for
example, constructed in advance of interviews and submitted as part of an ethical approval
application cannot ever hope to capture the direction and natural evolution of a genuinely
in-depth interview. Conversations are simply not that predictable. Flexibility and adaptation will
always be key. This contrasts with the development of instruments, such as questionnaires, in
quantitative work. Here, the instrument is fully designed before data collection occurs, some-
thing that is far more difficult to achieve in qualitative research.
Secondly, reliance on ethical approval processes has reduced research ethics to a series of
tokenistic mantras. Words and clichés such as “confidentiality,” “anonymity,” “informed con-
sent,” and “secure data storage” are ubiquitous and parroted by students and academics alike.
Similarly, examples of stock sentences that commonly occur in student (and faculty) methodol-
ogy chapters include “all data will be stored on a password protected computer/in a locked
cabinet,” “participation is entirely voluntary,” and “data made publicly available will be fully
anonymized.” Possibly the most banal sentence, indicative of the problem at hand, is “I have
obtained ethical approval from the university research ethics committee.” It demonstrates that
the researcher has ticked a box and complied with the institutional risk management framework
rather than engaged with research ethics in any meaningful sense. This is a phrase that seeks to
close off discussion about ethical issues rather than open up an authentic analysis of what these
matters might actually be.
Ethical approval processes are further predicated on assumptions with respect to the
“vulnerability” of those taking part in research. Here again the assumption is that all participants
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are vulnerable when, in reality, there might be some who may be far less vulnerable than the
researcher depending on their power and organizational position. Virtue signaling in respect to
vulnerability though is expected especially in respect to research involving children, those with a
limited educational background, and indigenous people along with an acknowledgment of the
power differential between the parties. This mantra works well where genuine power differences
exist, but where researchers are in an inferior power position compared with those that they are
researching (such as academics working in higher education), the concept of vulnerability is less
convincing.
Despite this complex reality, in practice a lot of real ethical issues in research remain unreported
or get artificially tidied up. While most close-up, qualitative researchers believe in the importance
of reflexivity, students tend to steer away from candid discussions regarding ethical challenges.
This is not surprising given the stern warnings students receive regarding the importance of
obtaining ethical approval in the first place and little else beyond this instruction. Having success-
fully navigated this bureaucratic hurdle students can be fearful that raising (real) ethical issues may
endanger their original ethical approval and so tend to stay silent, even if they have encountered
unpredictable challenges while conducting their research.
Symbolic citation
Many of those that subscribe to close-up qualitative research see it as more than simply gaining a
better understanding of practice and as a part of a radical agenda to bring about social change
through critical reflection and action.
One of the functions of close-up research with its emphasis on depth and understanding is an attempt to
explain why things are as they are and, where we identify wrongs, ceteris paribus how we might
change them. (Clegg et al., 2016, pp. 234–235)
In order to achieve such socially radical objectives, research is expected to be “critically theorised”
(Clegg et al., 2016, p. 238). Even if postgraduate students do not share such an agenda though, they
can feel obliged to gesture their compliance with particular ideological stances via a practice
known as symbolic citation. It has long been recognized that one reason for citation is for authors
to signal their allegiance to a school of thought representing “clusters of like-minded researchers
and scholars” (Allen, 1997, p. 937). This is a practice known as symbolic citation or copied
citations and is essentially a form of (soft) plagiarism. It is also, and more importantly for my
purposes in illustrating different forms of emotional performativity, about symbolizing the ideo-
logical credentials of the researcher through referencing the great and the good in a particular
school of thought. In seeking to explain why the majority of texts that cite others do not explore
their theoretical contributions, Ramos et al. (2012, p. 712) provided two possible explanations.
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Either publications have only been skim-read superficially or “are not read but are merely copied
from other works’ reference lists.” Both practices are common.
Students writing methodology chapters may enter into symbolic citation as a means of demon-
strating their emotional commitment to whichever philosophical/ideological position they have
chosen to align with. This frequently involves citing important and influential authors in a toke-
nistic way without demonstrating any depth of understanding about their ideas or (probably)
reading them. Classic examples of symbolic citation include referencing the work of Geertz
(1973) for ethnographic research or Glaser and Strauss (1967) for “grounded theory.” In the case
of a “thick description,” following the work of Geertz (1973), claims are sometimes very “thin,”
based, for example, on little more than standard interview data.
Symbolic citation can also give rise to mistakes which can be made by the original author of a
text and are then copied without checking for accuracy by others. Researchers frequently lift
references from other publications without consulting the original source (Broadus, 1983). This
means that when the author of a publication fails to cite correctly or accurately, the error can
become compounded in the literature. This can range from the correct spelling of an author’s name
to more serious misattributions. For example, the notion of four organizational cultures identified
by Harrison (1972) is widely attributed, by both students and academics alike, to Handy (1985)
who subsequently helped to popularize Harrison’s model of culture in his book Understanding
Organizations. At the time of writing (October 2020), and mainly as a result of the incorrect
attribution of the culture model, Handy’s book has approximately six times as many citations
(6,153) in Google Scholar as Harrison’s article (1,167).
In research methodology, symbolic citation is used for uncritical positive valorization of the-
orists and thinkers associated with social theory and method, such as Pierre Bourdieu, Michel
Foucault, Margaret Archer, Judith Butler, and Claude Lévi-Strauss. The flip side of this undiluted
adulation is where some ideas and concepts are roundly condemned as beyond the pale. Examples
of concepts regularly subject to condemnation include “managerialism” and “positivism.” Simi-
larly, the word “neoliberalism” is now used by academic writers as a term of abuse too (Lipscomb,
2019) having had its true meaning largely hollowed out in much the same way as “fascism”
became little more than a swear word in the 1940s, as Orwell (1944) observed.
A further attraction of symbolic citation for research students is that it helps to extend their list
of references with minimal effort without reading or really engaging with the cited texts. Citations
of key thinkers and authors add a verisimilitude or a scholarly gloss to a dissertation or thesis that
suggests a deep theoretical engagement that may be fake rather than real. It can provide an
opportunity to list “the great and the good” associated with a particular methodological camp or
group of critical theorists. The technological convenience of automated referencing tools such as
Endnote eases this process further. The very attentive student may even manage to include one or
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more references to the work of their supervisor as a signal of their devotion to their mentor’s
methodological position or ideological cause.
There are other practical reasons for symbolic citation connected with “bulking up” a disserta-
tion or thesis; 80,000 to 100,000 words is now widely regarded as a standard length of a doctoral
thesis in most parts of the West. However, the PhD thesis used to be more succinct and often
published as a short book when first introduced to British higher education in the 1920s (Goodchild
& Miller, 1997, p. 26). Hence, at a more mundane level, symbolic citation helps to pad out the
thesis. This is nonetheless still a form of fake learning since it is seeking to represent an academic
non-achievement as an achievement.
Pastoral power, culture, and discipleship
This article has been written largely from the perspective of working in a Western higher educa-
tional setting, albeit with significant numbers of international students present on master’s and
doctoral degree programs, a large proportion of whom are from China and elsewhere in East Asia.
In a Western educational context, the concept of social justice is strongly embedded in the rhetoric
of higher education practice. This helps to partly explain the emphasis given to the ethical treat-
ment of research subjects. Moreover, standardized ethical approval processes are rigorously
enforced and have become an article of faith of institutional policy and supervisory practice in
the West. However, supervisory practice needs to be understood as culturally framed. This means
that in other, non-Western higher education contexts across the globe there are different nuances
and cultural values that result in alternative displays of emotional performativity. For example, in
an East Asian context, the cultural norms of guanxi, respect for seniors, and obedience play a role
in shaping the supervisor–supervisee relationship. In both Western and non-Western contexts,
research students need to navigate different sets of cultural expectations. At the extreme, this can
result in forms of discipleship, where the academic apprentice becomes a devout follower of the
ideas and methodological convictions of their academic supervisor (Frow, 1988). Quite aside from
the risks of encouraging discipleship in terms of fake learning, it is a phenomenon that may further
retard the future intellectual development of an academic field.
In understanding why fake practices exist, academics need to practice what they preach by
being self-critical about the potential role of their own “pastoral power” (Atkinson, 2012). This
phrase, derived from the Anglosphere, means that academic supervisors are a powerful influence
on students and, in a research context, impressionable students may end up lip-syncing to the same
ideological tune as their supervisors. There is, hence, a need to recognize that strategic deception
arises because students get to know the methodological convictions of their supervisors only too
well. Someone’s whole persona, and professional identity, can be tied to a particular theoretical
approach (Trowler, 2012). When this occurs, methodological guidance can lapse into methodolatry
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and students can feel obliged to swear their allegiance to a flag that they do not really believe in.
There is growing evidence that students learning in many contexts strategically comply with the
demands for “reflection” on academic programs (Atkinson, 2012; Hobbs, 2007). The verisimili-
tude of qualitative, close-up research is linked to a researcher’s genuine commitment to reflexivity
and self-disclosure.
Perhaps 20 or 30 years ago, critical reflexivity was an overdue corrective to the apparent
invisibility of the researcher in the research process. It was rare for a researcher’s positionality
to be explicitly surfaced within methodological work. Today, in qualitative work, the reverse is
true. Positionality statements and references to reflexivity have become more of a stock conven-
tion. Is it even any longer valid to talk about “traditional” and “critical” approaches to research, or
has the “critical” perspective become the new “traditional”? At one level, this is a great success
story where critical reflexivity is explored authentically, but there also appears to be an increasing
tendency to treat the practices and lexicon of close-up research as ready-to-wear garments. When
ideas and concepts enter the mainstream, their meaning can quickly become oversimplified. The
nuances get stripped away. The word “reflection” has now sadly become little more than a
performance indicator for a range of professionals, including students completing dissertations
and theses in the social sciences.
We know that in the world of the news media—and fake news—it is important to find a
scapegoat. In attributing blame for the types of inauthenticity I have illustrated the obvious target
is the perpetrator: normally, but not always, the research student. Is it possible though that the
academic profession is responsible, at least in part, for this state of affairs? While the focus of this
article has been on the effect of emotional performativity on postgraduate students pursuing
independent research projects in higher education, it is probable that some (if not all) of these
learnt behaviors can be observed in the work of academics as well. This is especially true in respect
to symbolic citation given the weight of evidence that such practices are common across academia
(e.g., Ramos et al., 2012).
Conclusion
The examples given of fake learning in respect to the writing of methodology chapters in this
article illustrate the concept of emotional performativity. This concerns the way in which students
feel under pressure to comply with the moralistic and ideological elements of learning. In this
context, it can lead to a form of methodological political correctness. The moralistic elements of
learning about methodology involve parroting a sense of caring and sensitivity about the rights and
feelings of “participants” (ethical cleansing) and their potential desire to be actively engaged with
the research process (participatory posturing). The ideological elements of emotional performa-
tivity in respect to methodology involves personally affiliating with a preexisting sociopolitical
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school of thought or “camp” (methodolatry) and reinforcing this identity via phony positionality
and symbolic citation.
The presence of positionality and reflective statements in research reporting enhances the
apparent trustworthiness of the work of the lone researcher. Yet, there is a need to be aware of
the scope for disingenuous manipulation. Feeling fraudulent as an academic—otherwise known as
the “imposter syndrome”—is a common enough condition. When academics reflect on their
feelings of inadequacy, this tends to focus almost exclusively on their lives as teachers rather than
researchers (e.g., Overall, 1997). Perhaps there is a need to extend this self-analysis to the research
arena and the way in which “faking it” also occurs.
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